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INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATESThe United States submits this brief as amicus curiae pursuant toFed. R. App. P. 29(a).  The extent to which basic discoveries in geneticsmay be patented is a question of great importance to the nationaleconomy, to medical science, and to the public health.  This appealconsequently implicates the expertise and responsibilities of a widearray of federal agencies and components, including the Patent andTrademark Office (PTO), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), theAntitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention, the Office of Science and TechnologyPolicy, and the National Economic Council, among others.  The PTOwas a defendant below with respect to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims,but was not named as a defendant with respect to the statutory issuesnow before this Court. QUESTIONS PRESENTED1. Whether human-engineered DNA molecules, such as cDNAs, arepatent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.2. Whether isolated but otherwise unmodified genomic DNA ispatent-eligible subject matter under section 101.  
STATEMENTA. Patents for Genes and Genetic Inventions1.  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the SupremeCourt established that the man-made products of genetic engineeringare eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Patentand Trademark Office responded to Chakrabarty by granting patentson a wide range of engineered DNA molecules and useful geneticmethods.   The district court’s opinion in this case includes a helpfuldescription of the relevant principles of molecular biology and genetics. See A119-A139.   Briefly, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the chemical1molecule that encodes the instructions required by living cells toproduce the proteins essential for their structure and function.  DNAthus directly or indirectly controls nearly every aspect of an organism’sphysiology.  The basic structure of DNA comprises two complementarystrands of repeating chemical units, known as “nucleotides” or “bases,”bound together like a ladder and twisted into a distinctive double-helix.
 The prefix “A” denotes a citation to the addendum to appellants’1opening brief.  2
An organism’s complete set of DNA is its “genome.”  Withqualifications not relevant here, a “gene” is any section of DNA that,through its nucleotide sequence, governs the expression of a particularprotein.  Only certain portions of a gene’s sequence, known as “exons,”actually code for the protein that the gene expresses.  The remainingportions include upstream and downstream regulatory regions —information that governs, for example, how much of the protein the cellshould make and when it should be made — and non-codingintervening sequences, known as “introns,” that may also containinformation relevant to the expression of the gene.  Genes are the“basic units of heredity,” A121, that enable organisms to transmit tofuture generations the blueprint for making all essential proteins.DNA can be extracted from the natural cellular environment inwhich it occurs through established laboratory techniques.  A127.  Aparticular segment of DNA of interest, such as a gene, can then beexcised from the extracted material.  The result of this laboratoryprocess — a DNA molecule excised from the genome and separatedfrom its cellular environment — is commonly termed “isolated DNA.” The specifications of the patents at issue in this litigation define the
3
term “isolated DNA” in a manner generally consistent with this usage. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, col. 19, lines 8-18.  2.  The first United States patents relating to DNA moleculesissued at approximately the same time as the Chakrabarty decisionand were directed primarily to recombinant DNA vectors — i.e., man-made constructs of nucleic acids useful for cloning molecules of interestin host cells, such as bacteria or yeast.  Patents that claimed man-madecomplementary DNA molecules (cDNA) in combination with vectorsbegan to issue in 1982.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499 (1982)(claiming a recombinant DNA plasmid containing a cDNA).  Applicants eventually began to seek, and PTO began to grant,patents directed not only to synthetic DNA molecules such as cDNAsbut also to isolated but otherwise unaltered genomic DNA itself — thatis, genomic material excised from an organism’s genome and isolatedfrom the cellular environment in which it normally occurs, but withoutmaterial change to its naturally occurring chemical structure andfunction.  The first such patents claimed genes directly, without therubric of isolation or purification.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,472,502(1984) (claiming the Lactobacillus bacteria malolactic gene).  The first
4
patent using the term “isolated DNA” appears to have issued in 1987,although it was directed to a recombinant vector rather than genomicDNA.  See U.S. Patent No. 4,680,264, claim 27 (1987).  It is believedthat PTO issued the first patent claiming isolated but otherwiseunmodified human genomic DNA in the same period. In 2001, PTO published revised examination guidelines for the“utility” requirement of section 101.  See Utility ExaminationGuidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).  The guidelines attracteda number of public comments regarding the patent eligibility of isolatedgenes, and the agency’s response to those comments represents the onlywritten articulation of the agency’s views on the subject.  PTO statedthat, if the specification of a patent discloses a particular use for a gene— e.g., that the specified gene expresses a useful protein — then “aninventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on thegenetic composition isolated from its natural state and processedthrough purifying steps that separate the gene from other moleculesnaturally associated with it.”  Id. at 1093.  PTO stated that a DNAmolecule that has been “isolated” in this way is not a product of nature“because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in
5
nature.”  Ibid.; see also Reply in Support of Gov’t Mot. for Judgment onPleadings, docket no. 245, at 11 (“The USPTO’s position on thisquestion remains as set forth in its Utility Guidelines[.]”).3.  Until this case, no court had previously addressed whethersuch an isolated DNA molecule is patentable subject matter under35 U.S.C. § 101.  Cf. Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293(Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., concurring in part) (observing that “thus farthe question has evaded judicial review”).  Nor has the United Statespreviously expressed its view on that question in litigation.  B. The Challenged Claims At issue in this case are fifteen claims drawn from seven UnitedStates patents relating to the human genes known as Breast CancerSusceptibility Genes 1 and 2, or “BRCA1” and “BRCA2.”   See generally2A172-A178 (discussing the disputed patents and claims).  Located onhuman chromosomes 17 and 13, respectively, the BRCA1 and BRCA2
 The United States is a co-owner of four of the patents-in-suit. 2See A26 n.4.  As part of the settlement of an inventorship disputebetween Myriad and NIH in 1995, however, the government granted anexclusive license under those patents to Myriad.  That result isanomalous:  NIH ordinarily does not grant exclusive licenses underDNA patents for diagnostic applications.  6
genes express proteins that assist in the repair of damaged DNA andthe suppression of tumors.  Mutations in these genes are associatedwith significantly increased risks of breast and ovarian cancer.  SeeA146-A147.  The district court declared all of the challenged claimsinvalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, holding that the challenged compositionclaims are directed to unpatentable products of nature, see A214-A228,and that the method claims are directed to unpatentable abstract ideas,see A228-A242.Several of the composition claims in the patents-in-suit arelimited to cDNAs that encode the BRCA proteins.  See, e.g., U.S. PatentNo. 5,747,282, claim 2.Other claims at issue, however, would encompass isolated butotherwise unmodified human genomic DNA itself.  The district courtidentified claim 1 of the ‘282 patent as representative of the challengedcomposition claims:  An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, saidpolypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.  A173.  A “polypeptide” is a protein or protein fragment; “SEQ ID NO:2”is the amino-acid sequence of the BRCA1 protein as it occurs in nature. 
7
See ‘282 patent, col. 19, lines 41-50.  The specification defines the term“isolated DNA” to include not only cDNAs and similar man-madeconstructs, but also genomic DNA that has merely been “separatedfrom other cellular components which naturally accompany a nativehuman sequence” and “removed from its naturally occurringenvironment.”  Id. at col. 19, lines 8-18.  Likewise, the patent defines“encode” (synonymous with “coding for”) to include the ability of a DNAmolecule “in its native state” to express the desired protein.  See id. atcol. 19, lines 1-5.  Accordingly, claim 1 of the ‘282 patent encompasses any isolatedDNA molecule whose nucleotide sequence codes for the natural BRCA1protein.  See also U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, claim 1 (same, BRCA2).This would include an ordinary BRCA gene isolated from a tissuesample taken from a woman in a hospital. 
  
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTSection 101 marks the “threshold” of the patent system.  Bilski v.Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  It not only “defines the subjectmatter that may be patented,” ibid., but simultaneously defines whatmust remain in “‘the storehouse of knowledge of all men * * * free to allmen and reserved exclusively to none,’” ibid. (quoting Funk BrothersSeed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see BonitoBoats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (thepatent laws “determine not only what is protected, but also what is freefor all to use”).  The boundary between eligible and non-eligible subjectmatter is defined, in significant part, by the settled principle that thepatent laws do not embrace laws of nature, physical phenomena, orabstract ideas.  See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225.In attempting to apply that principle here, the district courterroneously cast doubt on the patent-eligibility of a broad range of man-made compositions of matter whose value derives from the information-encoding capacity of DNA.  Such compositions — e.g., cDNAs, vectors,recombinant plasmids, and chimeric proteins, as well as countlessindustrial products, such as vaccines and genetically modified crops,9
created with the aid of such molecules — are in every meaningful sensethe fruits of human ingenuity and thus qualify as “‘human-madeinventions’” eligible for patent protection under section 101.  J.E.M. AgSupply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001)(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980)).  Thedistrict court therefore erred in invalidating the challenged compositionclaims, such as claim 2 of the ‘282 patent, that are directed solely tocDNAs.The district court correctly held, however, that genomic DNA thathas merely been isolated from the human body, without furtheralteration or manipulation, is not patent-eligible.  Unlike thegenetically engineered microorganism in Chakrabarty, the uniquechain of chemical base pairs that induces a human cell to express aBRCA protein is not a “human-made invention.”  Nor is the fact thatparticular natural mutations in that unique chain increase a woman’schance of contracting breast or ovarian cancer.  Indeed, the relationshipbetween a naturally occurring nucleotide sequence and the molecule itexpresses in a human cell — that is, the relationship between genotypeand phenotype — is simply a law of nature.  The chemical structure of10
native human genes is a product of nature, and it is no less a product ofnature when that structure is “isolated” from its natural environmentthan are cotton fibers that have been separated from cotton seeds orcoal that has been extracted from the earth.The scope of Section 101 is purposefully wide and its threshold isnot difficult to cross.  See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225.  New and usefulmethods of identifying, isolating, extracting, or using genes and geneticinformation may be patented (subject to the prohibition againstpatenting abstract ideas), as may nearly any man-made transformationor manipulation of the raw materials of the genome, such as cDNAs. Thus, the patent laws embrace gene replacement therapies, engineeredbiologic drugs, methods of modifying the properties of plants orgenerating biofuels, and similar advanced applications of biotechnology. Crossing the threshold of section 101, however, requires somethingmore than identifying and isolating what has always existed in nature,no matter how difficult or useful that discovery may be.
11
ARGUMENTA. Section 101 Embraces Only “Human-Made Inventions.”Section 101 of the Patent Act “defines the subject matter that maybe patented.”  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  Thestatute provides:  “Whoever invents or discovers any new and usefulprocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any newand useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subjectto the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 101.  “‘Inchoosing such expansive terms * * * modified by the comprehensive‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would begiven wide scope.’”  Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v.Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).The patent laws do not, however, embrace the products andprocesses of nature itself.  “He who discovers a hitherto unknownphenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the lawrecognizes.”  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,130 (1948).  Whether understood as an interpretation of section 101 oras a judicially recognized exception to it, this principle has “defined the
12
reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back150 years.”  Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225.  Thus, “a new mineral discoveredin the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subjectmatter.  Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law thatE=mc ; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.  Such2discoveries are ‘manifestations of * * * nature, free to all men andreserved exclusively to none.’”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quotingFunk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130); see also, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450U.S. 175, 185-86 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972);Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853).The Supreme Court has twice addressed the application of theseprinciples to innovations in biotechnology.  In Chakrabarty, the Courtheld that a genetically engineered microorganism useful for digestingoil spills was a patentable manufacture or composition of matter undersection 101.  The Court emphasized that “the patentee has produced anew bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any foundin nature and one having the potential for significant utility.  Hisdiscovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is
13
patentable subject matter under § 101.”  447 U.S. at 310.  In J.E.M. AgSupply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), theCourt held that human-developed plant breeds are eligible for patentprotection under section 101.  Id. at 131.  In each case, the SupremeCourt stressed that “‘the relevant distinction’” for purposes of section101 is not “‘between living and inanimate things, but between productsof nature * * * and human-made inventions.’”  J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534U.S. at 130 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).  This settleddistinction between “products of nature” and “human-made inventions”provides the touchstone for resolving this appeal.B. Engineered DNA Molecules, Including cDNAs, Are Human-Made Inventions Eligible For Patent Protection.Against this background, the district court was clearly mistakenin invalidating the challenged composition claims, such as claim 2 ofthe ‘282 patent, that are limited to cDNAs.  The court further erred inimplying that any isolated DNA molecule whose value derives from theinformation-encoding capacity of DNA must be deemed anunpatentable product of nature.  See, e.g., A218, A221-A222.  Moleculesthat are engineered by humans, including cDNAs, vectors, recombinant
14
plasmids, chimeric proteins, and similar fruits of the manipulation ofgenetic material, will almost invariably be patent-eligible subjectmatter.  These molecules generally do not occur in nature, but areinstead the synthetic results of scientists’ manipulation of the naturallaws of genetics.  cDNAs, for example, are synthetic molecules engineered byscientists to incorporate, in a single contiguous DNA segment, only theexons (i.e, protein-coding sequences) of a naturally occurring gene, andto exclude the intervening introns and other regulatory regions thatnormally separate the exons in genomic DNA.  With rare exceptions(such as retroviruses that use cDNA-like structures to replicatethemselves), such molecules do not occur in nature, either in isolationor as contiguous sequences contained within longer natural molecules,but instead must be synthesized by scientists in the laboratory fromother genetic materials.  See A134 (acknowledging that “cDNA istypically generated by scientists in a laboratory”); see generally Albertset al., Molecular Biology of the Cell 503 & fig. 8-34 (4th ed. 2002)(describing the process of synthesizing double-stranded cDNAmolecules).  The utility of such molecules, moreover, is clear:  because15
cDNAs are stable DNA compounds that reflect only the codingsequences of a gene, they “can be used as a tool for biotechnological anddiagnostic applications for which native DNA cannot be used.”  A135.  Likewise, recombinant vectors and similar biotechnologicalinnovations are man-made constructs that permit the direct yoking ofnatural processes for mankind’s purposes, such as coaxing a bacterialcell to express a human protein.  See Alberts, Molecular Biology of theCell, at 500-01.  Like the genetically engineered microorganism inChakrabarty, biological innovations of this kind are “not nature’shandiwork,” 447 U.S. at 310, and thus are patent-eligible subjectmatter under section 101.  Notably, plaintiffs have not challenged any of the claims in thepatents-in-suit directed solely to recombinant vectors or similarmolecules.  Claim 8 of the ‘282 patent, for example, claims a“replicative cloning vector which comprises the isolated DNA of claim 1or parts thereof and a replicon operative in a host cell.”  Just as theengineered microorganism in Chakrabarty included many (indeed,most) of the features of the natural bacterium from which it wascreated, the mere fact that a non-naturally occurring polynucleotide,16
such as the recombinant vector in claim 8 of the ‘282 patent,incorporates nucleotide sequences whose significance is derived fromnature does not mean the claim as a whole is directed to a product ofnature.  Cf. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (for section 101 purposes, “claimsmust be considered as a whole”).  It is possible that, in light of the prevailing level of knowledge inthe biotechnological arts, future patent applications directed to cDNAsand simple recombinant vectors may be rejected as obvious.  Seegenerally In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358-61 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Suchmolecules, however, constitute man-made compositions of matter thatare eligible for patent protection where the other requirements ofTitle 35 are satisfied.C. Isolated But Otherwise Unmodified Genomic DNA Is Not A Human-Made Invention.The same cannot be said, however, of genomic DNA merelyisolated from a cell in the human body.  Methods of identifying,isolating, and using such DNA molecules may be patented, as may anynew and useful alteration of those molecules through humanintervention.  Genomic DNA itself, however, is a product of nature that
17
is ineligible for patent protection, whether or not claimed in “isolated”form.We acknowledge that this conclusion is contrary to thelongstanding practice of the Patent and Trademark Office, as well asthe practice of the National Institutes of Health and other governmentagencies that have in the past sought and obtained patents for isolatedgenomic DNA.  The district court’s judgment in this case, however,prompted the United States to reevaluate the relationship betweensuch patents and the settled principle under Supreme Court precedentthat the patent laws do not extend to products of nature.  For thereasons below, the United States has concluded that isolated butotherwise unaltered genomic DNA is not patent-eligible subject matterunder 35 U.S.C. § 101.1. Unmodified Genomic DNA Is A Product Of Nature.No one doubts that the native BRCA genes in situ are products ofnature.  The unique nucleotide sequence that induces human cells toexpress the BRCA1 protein was not invented by appellants or, for thatmatter, by scientists at NIH.  Nor was the fact that certain mutations
18
in those sequences and not others (see, e.g., claim 7 of the ‘282 patent)are associated with an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer.  TheBRCA genes, their deleterious alleles, and their relationship to breastcancer are the products of evolution, not human invention.  Like themutually non-inhibitive qualities of the bacterial strains in FunkBrothers, the cancer-inhibitive qualities of the BRCA gene products are“manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reservedexclusively to none.”  333 U.S. at 130.Indeed, the relationship between a naturally occurring nucleotidesequence and the molecule it induces a human cell to express — that is,the relationship between genotype and phenotype — is simply a law ofnature.  The fact that a particular segment of the human genome codesfor the BRCA1 protein in a human cell, for example, rather than foradrenaline or insulin or nothing at all, is not within the power ofscience to alter.  Such basic natural relationships may not be thesubject of a patent.
19
2. “Isolation” Does Not Transform A Product Of NatureInto A Man-Made Invention.  The basic composition claims at issue in this case are directed notto the wild-type or mutated BRCA genes in situ but to “isolated” DNAmolecules that have the same chemical structure and function but havebeen extracted from the natural cellular environment.   The “isolated”3limitation must therefore carry the entire weight of these claims: absent that limitation, claim 1 of the ‘282 patent, for example, wouldencompass the native BRCA1 gene in the human body, which likewise“cod[es] for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the aminoacid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2” (i.e., the naturally occurringBRCA1 protein).
 Several of the disputed claims are framed in functional terms3that would additionally encompass non-naturally occurring alleles ofthe BRCA genes and related cDNAs.  Claim 1 of the ‘282 patent, forexample, would encompass not only the isolated wild-type gene, butalso a laboratory-synthesized DNA molecule that has a differentnucleotide sequence from the wild-type gene but, because differentcodons may code for the same amino acids, nonetheless encodes theclaimed BRCA1 polypeptide.  Like other man-made molecules,synthetic alleles of this kind are clearly patent-eligible subject matter,and a claim limited to such alleles would survive scrutiny under section101 (although it might be held obvious over the natural gene).20
Yet the fact of “isolation” is inadequate for the task.  The merefact that genes do not occur in “isolated” form in nature does notprovide a principled basis for patent-eligibility.   See Intervet, 617 F.3dat 1294-95 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).  Many natural products — coalbeneath the earth, cotton fibers mixed with cotton seeds, the stigmas ofthe saffron flower — must be physically separated, i.e., “isolated,” fromtheir natural environments before becoming useful to mankind, but fewwould doubt that coal, cotton, and saffron are products of nature andnot patent-eligible.  Likewise, the unique nucleotide sequence thatinduces human cells to express the BRCA1 protein is no more aninvention of appellants or NIH when captured in a test tube than in itsnatural context in the human body.  The process of applying restrictionenzymes to select and extract a naturally occurring segment of DNA inthe human genome from its chromosomal environment (now wellunderstood in the art) was undoubtedly patent-eligible when it wasfirst conceived, and an improved process for doing so may be the subjectof a patent in the future.  But the isolated DNA segment itself remains,in structure and function, what it was in the human body.  
21
Common sense would suggest that a product of nature is nottransformed into a human-made invention merely by isolating it.  Thevery term “isolated” suggests only that extraneous matter has beenseparated from the natural product of interest, not that the productitself has been transformed or altered into something man-made.  TheSupreme Court explicitly noted in Funk Brothers, for example, that thepatentee had “isolated” the mutually non-inhibitive strains of bacteria“by certain methods of selection and testing.”  333 U.S. at 130.  Underappellants’ theory, the isolated bacteria in Funk Brothers thatexhibited valuable and previously unknown qualities in their isolatedstate would have been patentable in their own right.  Yet the Courtheld that the quality “of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria”— a quality that was doubtless the consequence of genetic variation,though the fact was unappreciated at the time — was “the work ofnature” and, accordingly, beyond the reach of the patent laws.   Ibid.4
 Although appellants characterize Funk Brothers as an4obviousness case, they correctly acknowledge (Br. 44) that the Court’sreasoning relied on principles of patent eligibility.  The Supreme Courthas thus repeatedly cited Funk Brothers for the proposition thatproducts of nature are not patent-eligible under section 101.  See, e.g.,Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 309-10. 22
The discovery of any number of basic natural phenomena could berecharacterized as the “invention” of an isolated “manufacture” or“composition of matter” under section 101.  For example, many highlyreactive elements on the periodic table, such as lithium, occur in natureonly in chemical compounds (i.e., salts).  Not until 1818 was lithium,which has innumerable industrial applications, first isolated in metallicform by Sir Humphry Davy and W.T. Brande.  See Krebs, The Historyand Use of Our Earth’s Chemical Elements:  A Reference Guide 48 (2ded. 2006).  That accomplishment marked a significant achievement inchemistry, but it did not entitle Davy and Brande to claim a patent onthe third element in the periodic table.  Cf. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at130 (the “qualities of metals” are “part of the storehouse of knowledgeof all men”).  Courts in the early part of the 20th century repeatedlyrejected claims for isolated natural elements as new “manufactures.” See Gen. Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928)(pure ductile tungsten, though previously thought impossible toproduce, held unpatentable as a product of nature); In re Marden, 47F.2d 957 (CCPA 1931) (same, pure ductile uranium); In re Marden, 47
23
F.2d 958 (CCPA 1931) (same, pure ductile vanadium); cf. In re Seaborg,328 F.2d 996 (CCPA 1964) (upholding patent for element 95,americium, which does not occur in nature).  The unacceptableimplication of appellants’ argument is that these cases were wronglydecided.   5Similarly, Hans Dehmelt won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1989for being the first to isolate a single electron free of the atom, anaccomplishment with useful applications in atomic clocks and otherdevices.  Dehmelt undoubtedly could have patented his process andapparatus for isolating an electron in free space, as well as any methodfor exploiting the characteristics of electrons thus isolated, assuming
 Appellants erroneously suggest (Br. 44 n.3) that De Forest Radio5and the Marden cases involved considerations of obviousness ratherthan patentable subject matter.  In fact, those decisions were expresslypredicated on the ineligibility of natural products for patent protection. See, e.g., De Forest Radio, 28 F.2d at 643 (“What he discovered werenatural qualities of pure tungsten.  Manifestly he did not create puretungsten, nor did he create its characteristics.  These were created bynature and on that fact finding the reasoning as to the validity of theproduct claims will be based.”); Marden, 47 F.2d at 957 (“Uranium is aproduct of nature, and the appellant is not entitled to a patent on thesame, or upon any of the inherent natural qualities of that metal.”);Marden, 47 F.2d at 959 (“The quality of purity of vanadium or itsductility is a quality of a natural product and as such is notpatentable.”).  24
the other requirements of Title 35 were satisfied.  But Dehmelt plainlydid not invent the elemental unit of negative charge in the universe. Nonetheless, on appellants’ theory, Dehmelt could have patented theisolated electron itself (as a “manufacture”) and thereby arrogated tohimself the exclusive right to conduct experiments in electron quantumphysics for twenty years.  6Accordingly, PTO historically rejected isolation alone as the testfor determining patent eligibility.  In Ex parte Latimer, 46 O.G. 1638,1889 Dec. Comm’r Patent 123 (1889), for example, the Commissionerrejected a claim for a fiber from the needles of the Pinus australis tree. The claim recited that the fiber was extracted “in full lengths from thesilicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the pine needles.”  Id. at 123. Stressing that the claimed fiber was identical to what occurred innature, the Commissioner concluded that “it is a natural product andcan no more be the subject of a patent in its natural state when freed
 The Supreme Court in Chakrabarty observed that Newton could6not have patented the law of gravity, 447 U.S. at 309; surely that prizedoes not still await the first scientist to isolate the graviton.  25
from its surroundings than wheat which has been cut by a reaper.”   Id.7at 127.  Likewise, in Ex parte Berkman, 90 U.S.P.Q. 398 (1951), the Boardheld ineligible for patent protection a “physiologically active material* * * derived from fresh raw plant material * * * being furthercharacterized by being substantially free of cellulosic material,electrolytes and enzymes.”  Id. at 399.  Although the claimed materialwas “actually isolated,” id. at 400, the Board concluded that “claims to a
 As the Supreme Court noted in Chakrabarty, the7Commissioner’s decision in Latimer led to a widespread conviction inthe early part of the 20th century that all plant products, includingartificially bred plants, were unpatentable products of nature.  See 447U.S. at 311-12.  Congress responded in part by enacting the PlantPatent Act of 1930, which granted a limited form of patent protection tothe inventors of human-created, asexually reproducing plants.  Id. at312-13; see 35 U.S.C. § 161.  The accompanying Senate Reportexplained in detail why, in Congress’s judgment, it was permissible toextend patent protection to such artificially bred plants:  “It is obviousthat nature originally creates plants but it cannot be denied that manoften controls and directs the natural processes and produces a desiredresult.”  S. Rep. No. 71-315, at 6-7 (1930).  Just as a chemist “avail[s]himself of the physical and chemical qualities inherent in the materialsused and of the natural principles applicable to matter” to develop “newcompositions of matter which are patentable under existing law,” theSenate report reasoned, a plant breeder “avails himself of the naturalprinciples of genetics and of seed and bud variations” and “cultivatesthe plants in his own laboratory under his own eye.”  Id. at 7 (emphasisadded). 26
product formed by nature’s processes are as a rule held to be invalid,even when invention can be recognized in the method of isolating themor otherwise obtaining them from the environment in which they arefound in nature.”  Id. at 401.  These decisions state the correct rule.3. Isolated Genomic DNA Is Not Patent-Eligible MerelyBecause It Is A Literal Composition Of Matter.  Appellants urge (Br. 31) that an isolated gene is patentablesubject matter because it is a complex chemical polymer, a literalcomposition of matter.  But that does not make an isolated gene a “newand useful * * * composition of matter” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.§ 101 any more than the fact that the mathematical method in Bensonwas a literal “process” could have made that method eligible forpatenting.  See also Ex Parte Latimer, supra.  The Supreme Courtrecently reiterated that, although the terms of section 101 are normallyconstrued in accordance with their “ordinary, contemporary, commonmeaning,” Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226, the Court has “deviate[d]” fromthat ordinary meaning where necessary to accommodate the settledexceptions for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstractideas,” ibid.  Indeed, the Supreme Court did so in Bilski itself, holding
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that the claimed method of hedging financial risk, though a literalprocess, was not a “process” within the meaning of section 101.  Seealso American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex, 283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931)(orange treated with borax to prevent mold, though the product of anindustrial process, was not a patent-eligible “manufacture”).  The Supreme Court has long ago applied the same principle tocompositions of matter.  In Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik,111 U.S. 293 (1884), for example, the plaintiff obtained a patent for aprocess of artificially manufacturing alizarine, a red dye that naturallyoccurs in the root of the madder plant, and for the artificial alizarine(identical to natural alizarine) that was the result of the claimedprocess.  Although alizarine is a literal “composition of matter,” thealleged infringer defended, inter alia, on the ground that the dye “is anatural product, having a well-known definite constitution; that it isnot a composition of matter, within the meaning of the statute, but hasbeen well known in the arts, from time immemorial, for the purpose ofdyeing.”  Id. at 297.  The Supreme Court upheld the process claim butrejected the patentee’s claim for the alizarine compound itself,
28
explaining:  “While a new process for producing it was patentable, theproduct itself could not be patented, even though it was a product madeartificially for the first time, in contradistinction to being eliminatedfrom the madder root.  Calling it artificial alizarine did not make it anew composition of matter, and patentable as such, by reason of itshaving been prepared artificially, for the first time * * * *.”  Id. at 311.  Likewise here:  a new process for producing an isolated gene maybe patented, as may a new process for using such an isolated gene.  Butthe natural product itself cannot be patented, even though it isseparated from the genome artificially for the first time.4. Isolated Genomic DNA Is Not Rendered PatentableOn The Theory That It Is “Pure.”  Appellants also defend the challenged claims on the basis of anold line of cases holding that compounds extracted from nature may, innarrow circumstances, be patented in purified form.  See, e.g.,Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir.1910); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y.1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).  Whether this line of authority
29
survives the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and FunkBrothers is open to doubt.  Regardless, these cases do not hold that natural products may bepatented whenever they are extracted from impure environments. Rather, they provide that patent eligibility may arise when a naturalcompound has been so refined and purified through humanintervention as to become a substance different in kind from thenatural product.  In Parke-Davis, for example, Judge Learned Handstressed that the claimed form of adrenaline was so different intherapeutic operation from impure forms that it “was a distinction notin degree, but in kind.”  189 F. at 103.  See also In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599(CCPA 1938) (rejecting a claim for pure ultramarine as lacking any newand different features over impure ultramarine, but noting that if anapplicant “produces an article of such purity that it differs not only indegree but in kind it may be patentable”); In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 620(CCPA 1939) (rejecting a claim for vitamin C purified from lemon juice,explaining:  “Lemon juice has been known for ages as a satisfactory
30
specific for scurvy. * * * Difference in degree of purity itself does notpredicate invention.”).It may be that “purification” — depending on what is meant bythat term — can in some cases transform a natural substance into anew compound sufficiently different in kind from its natural ancestor tocross the threshold of section 101.   But this case involves no such8transformation.  The “pure” human BRCA1 polynucleotide claimed inthe ‘282 patent is structurally identical to the DNA segment that occursin the human body, apart from the fact of its isolation itself.  Indeed,the structural identity of the isolated gene and the wild-type gene is thevery point of the patent.  As the district court noted, “the entirepremise behind Myriad’s genetic testing is that the claimed isolatedDNA retains, in all relevant respects, the identical nucleotide sequencefound in native DNA,” thereby rendering it valuable for medicaldiagnostic and therapeutic applications.  A224.
 A chemical alteration of a bioactive molecule to improve8absorption by the body, for example, could be described as “purification”and would likely satisfy section 101.  Merely sorting the proverbialwheat from the chaff, however, would not.  31
Likewise, the function of the claimed isolated BRCA genes isexactly the same as the function of the identical DNA segments in thebody.  Two of the composition claims at issue are literally defined bytheir natural biological function:  the capacity to express BRCA1 andBRCA2 proteins.  See ‘282 patent, claim 1 (BRCA1); ‘492 patent,claim 1 (BRCA2).  It is that intrinsic natural function, common to boththe isolated and native forms of the gene, which makes the geneattractive to appellants and important to the medical community.  Under these circumstances, the contention that a “purified” geneis patent-eligible merely because it does not occur in “pure” form innature is essentially indistinguishable from the “isolation” rationale,and fails for the same reasons.  A product of nature is unpatentablebecause it is not the inventive work of humankind.  That essential rulecannot be circumvented by drafting claims for the same natural productremoved from its natural environment and proclaiming the result“pure.”   If section 101’s “product of nature” limitation on patent-9
 The CCPA in In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (CCPA 1970),9overturned PTO’s rejection of a patent for purified prostaglandins,emphasizing that the pure forms did not exist in nature.  See id. at1401.  The court’s analysis, however, was framed largely in terms of32
eligibility means anything, it must mean that the mere act of culling anatural product from its environment to uncover or exploit itspreexisting natural qualities or functions — however useful thosequalities or functions may be — is insufficient to create patentablesubject matter.  The fundamental question under section 101 iswhether the inventor has created something through the application ofhuman ingenuity or merely exposed something previouslyunappreciated in nature.  See J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 134;Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.  In this case, the answer is the latter.
whether the claimed invention was “new” within the meaning ofsections 101 and 102, not whether it constituted a patent-eligible“composition of matter” under Supreme Court case law.  See generallyid. at 1400-01.  This Court has consequently understood Bergstrom asan inherent anticipation case.  See Schering Corp. v. GenevaPharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In reBergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (noting that Bergstrom “in effecttreated the [§ 101] rejection as if it had been made under § 102”). Moreover, Bergstrom, which predated the Supreme Court’s decision inChakrabarty, did not discuss or purport to overrule previous CCPAcases, such as In re King and In re Merz, supra, establishing that themere act of purifying a natural molecule does not render the resultpatent-eligible.  33
5. Isolated Genomic DNA Is Not Patent-Eligible MerelyBecause It Is Useful Or Requires Investment ToIdentify.Finally, appellants urge that isolated genomic DNA has practicaluses that native DNA does not, and that section 101 should beconstrued in a manner that provides an incentive for companies toidentify, describe, and develop those uses into commercial applicationsthat promote the public welfare.  This contention, however, rests onseveral erroneous premises.First, while isolated genomic DNA may have more potentialapplications than human genes in their natural context, the same isequally true of mined coal, separated cotton fibers, pure metalliclithium, ductile uranium, and other products of nature whose industrialvalue to mankind likewise arises when they are extracted from theirnaturally occurring environments.  A person who invents a new anduseful industrial application for isolated genomic DNA — or any otherproduct of nature — is entitled to seek a process patent for thatapplication.  But the underlying natural compound itself is not patent-eligible. 
34
Similarly, appellants’ assertion that patent protection for rawisolated genomic DNA provides an incentive to make discoveries ofvalue to society, see Br. 3-4, does not distinguish isolated genes fromother, clearly unpatentable products of nature.  Granting patentprotection for previously unknown mineral ores or plants growing inthe wild, for example, would surely encourage private investment inmining and botanical expeditions, but it does not follow that mineralsand wild plants are patent-eligible subject matter under section 101. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“[A] new mineral discovered in theearth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subjectmatter.”); see also Ex parte Foster, 1951 Dec. Comm’r Patent 15 (1951)(previously unknown plant discovered in the wild in South America wasnot patentable subject matter).  Crossing the threshold of section 101 requires something morethan identifying and isolating what has always existed in nature, nomatter how difficult or useful that discovery may be.  Nearly everybiotechnological or pharmaceutical application of genomic DNA willinvolve a welter of potentially patentable products and methods: engineered DNA molecules, including cDNAs; processes of extraction35
and purification; optimized pharmaceutical compounds (pills, vaccines);methods of preparing and administering the same; and so on.  Thesemay include very broad and fundamental claims (e.g., “method oftreating cancer by administering an effective amount of compound X”).  Claims directed to such “human-made inventions,” Chakrabarty, 447U.S. at 313, properly capture what the inventor has in fact contributedto society, without precluding the public’s access to “the basic tools ofscientific and technological work,” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
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CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the districtcourt’s invalidation of the composition claims that are limited to cDNAsand similar man-made constructs, but affirm the district court’sconclusion that the claims encompassing isolated human genomic DNAare invalid. Respectfully submitted,
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